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In this paper, we investigate cyber-threats and the underlying infrastructures. More pre-
cisely, we detect and analyze cyber-threat infrastructures for the purpose of unveiling key
players (owners, domains, IPs, organizations, malware families, etc.) and the relationships
between these players. To this end, we propose metrics to measure the badness of different
infrastructure elements using graph theoretic concepts such as centrality concepts and
Google PageRank. In addition, we quantify the sharing of infrastructure elements among
different malware samples and families to unveil potential groups that are behind speciﬁc
attacks. Moreover, we study the evolution of cyber-threat infrastructures over time to infer
patterns of cyber-criminal activities. The proposed study provides the capability to derive
insights and intelligence about cyber-threat infrastructures. Using one year dataset, we
generate notable results regarding emerging threats and campaigns, important players
behind threats, linkages between cyber-threat infrastructure elements, patterns of cyber-
crimes, etc.
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of DFRWS. This is an open access
article under theCCBY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).Introduction
Nowadays, many cyber-criminals make use of network
resources to conduct their malicious activities. For instance,
they set up networks known as botnets, to perpetrate at-
tacks against corporations or Internet users. A leading
server, known as botmaster, instructs malware-infected
machines to steal data, perform reconnaissance, launch
DDoS attacks, etc. Some malware steal sensitive informa-
tion and send it to depots of stolen informationmanaged by
cyber-criminals. The collected information is used by
criminals for their own beneﬁt, such as using credit card
numbers to purchase goods for reselling. To ensure theoukhtouta).
vier Ltd on behalf of DFRWstealth of botnet activities, criminals make use of DNS
protocol. They use fast-ﬂuxing and dynamic DNS tech-
niques to change domain names and resolving IPs. Thus,
they manage to avoid malicious IPs and domains being
blacklisted. These techniques allow cyber-threat in-
frastructures to expand through many ISPs and registrars,
resulting in a platform to orchestrate malicious activities.
In this paper, we investigate cyber-threats and the un-
derlying infrastructures. In particular, we answer the
following questions: (1) What are the elements of a cyber-
threat infrastructure and their inter-relationships? (2)
What are the infrastructures used by cyber-criminals to
perpetrate attacks? (3) What are the most important
players in terms of organizations and people that are con-
tacts for registered malicious domains and IP addresses?
(4) How cyber-threat infrastructures evolve over time? ToS. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://
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correlate the different sources of malware, threat and
network data such as dynamic malware analysis reports,
passive DNS, Whois and antivirus engines databases. We
extract and gather various threat-related information such
as malicious domains/IPs, owners, organizations, registrars,
etc. This information is used to conduct an in-depth anal-
ysis of cyber-threat infrastructures by employing graph
theory concepts. The use of graph theory is of crucial
importance since it offers the characterization of the
interaction between the infrastructure actors and the
identiﬁcation of inﬂuential elements or groups. In addition,
it provides a structure for studying how graphs evolve over
time.
We identify cyber-threat infrastructures by examining
the connectivity of graph components. In addition, we
discover the most important players in cyber-threat in-
frastructures using metrics that measure the badness of
different infrastructure elements through the computation
of centrality concepts (e.g., degree centrality, betweenness
centrality, closeness centrality) and node inﬂuence con-
cepts, namely Google PageRank (Brin and Page (1998)). This
is achieved by assigning a score and rank to each element
within the infrastructure. Moreover, we study the evolution
of cyber-threat infrastructures over time by computing
graph similarities. To this end, we use the so-called graph
kernels (Ralaivola et al. (2005); Vishwanathan et al. (2010);
G€artner (2003)) andmin-hash ﬁngerprinting (Teixeira et al.
(2012)), which is an effective technique for comparing
large-scale graphs. The main contributions of our work are
the following. First, we deﬁne the different elements of
cyber-threat infrastructures and their relationships. Sec-
ond, we put forward a methodology to investigate cyber-
threat infrastructures. More precisely: (1) We identify the
most important players (e.g., owners, domains, IPs, orga-
nizations) by measuring the badness of different infra-
structure elements. (2) We quantify the sharing of
infrastructure elements between different malware sam-
ples and families. The sharing lies within intra- and inter-
malware families. This is of paramount importance, as it
helps to identify the groups that are behind the appearance
of malware samples. (3) We study the evolution of cyber-
threat infrastructures over time to infer patterns.
The proposed methodology provides the capability to
derive important intelligence about cyber-threat in-
frastructures. We have applied our methods on one-year
dataset to generate several statistics and insights
regarding emerging threats and campaigns, important
players behind cyber-threats, linkages between cyber-
threat infrastructure elements, patterns of cybercrimes,
etc. These insights are relevant to law enforcement
agencies to establish a situational awareness of cyber-
threat infrastructures, devise appropriate strategies and
set priorities for takedowns.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In
Approach Section, we describe our approach to investigate
cyber-threat infrastructures. In Experimental Results Sec-
tion, we provide statistics and insights generated from the
analysis of cyber-threat infrastructures. Related works are
introduced in Related Work Section. Finally, we conclude
with a discussion and future works in Conclusion Section.Approach
In this work, we develop a framework to collect insights
and intelligence out of dynamic malware analysis. Malware
samples tend to exhibit a cooperative strategy with remote
malicious domains and IPs to perpetrate malicious activ-
ities, e.g., stealing credentials, spam propagation, advanced
DDoS attacks, etc. In the light of these facts, we design and
integrate an approach to generate cyber-threat intelligence
for the purpose of identifying the infrastructures used by
malware to threaten the cyber-space. Our approach to
generate cyber-intelligence is depicted in Fig. 1. The
approach falls into: (1) data collection, (2) cyber-threat
graph generation, (3) descriptive statistics, (4) badness
scoring and (5) patterns inference.
Data collection
We collect malware samples on a daily basis from a
trusted third party ThreatTrack (2015). These malware
samples are analyzed through a sandbox technology to
monitor malware behavior on either physical or virtual
machines. The malware behavior is stored in XML reports.
We usually manage to get an average of 45,000 malware
reports per day. For each report, we extract the domains
visited by malware samples, IPs resolving to these domains
and IPs directly connected by malware through FTP, SMTP,
IRC servers as well as plain UDP and TCP connections.
Furthermore, we use VirusTotal malware naming schema
to get malware family information out of 54 anti-virus
engines. In addition, we use Whois database to get do-
mains and IPs records. The intent is to gather domains’
owners, organizations, registrars, physical addresses, net-
works and name-servers.
Cyber-threat graph generation
Li (2014) introduced the intelligence collection process
based on different data sources. Being inspired by this
concept, we use data collected from dynamic malware
analysis and Whois database to deﬁne a cyber-threat
infrastructure, which is composed as a set of components
involved in malware activities (Fig. 2). The components of a
cyber-threat infrastructure are: malware, domains, IP ad-
dresses, FTP servers, SMTP servers, IRC channels, time-
stamps, organizations, registrars, technical people,
administrative people and domain owners. The interaction
between the infrastructure components can be stated as
follows: A malware tends to visit domains, which can be
command and control servers (C&Cs) or redirections of
legitimate domains to malicious proxies. These domains
are resolved to IPs. They also usually have second-level
domains. On the other hand, malware can connect to FTP
servers to upload stolen information or download other
malware binaries. Malware can also connect to SMTP
servers to conduct spamming activities or IRC channels to
interact with IRC botnets. They can also connect directly
through non-conventional TCP and UDP protocols for the
purpose of cooperating with infected machines or C&Cs.
FTP/SMTP servers and IRC channels can be hosted within a
second-level domain server. The latter is registered within
Fig. 1. Approach overview.
Fig. 2. Cyber-threat infrastructure schema.
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administrative contact, a technical support contact and an
owner. Each domain or a second-level domain has a crea-
tion timestamp, expiration timestamp and passive DNS
ﬁrst/last seen timestamps. An organization can have more
than one IP block and be located in different countries.
We represent cyber-threat infrastructures as a complex
network of directed graphs. The vertices of the graph
represent components of cyber-threat infrastructures, i.e.,
malware, domains, IPs, FTP/SMTP servers, IRC channels,
organizations, registrars, technical/administrative people,
domain owners and physical addresses. Collection time-
stamps are properties of malware nodes, whereas ﬁrst/last
seen timestamps, creation and expiration timestamps are
properties of second-level domains.
Fig. 3 illustrates a directed graph representing a cyber-
threat infrastructure. The red vertices represent malware
samples connecting to domains (blue vertices). Both of
these domains resolve to the same IP address (yellowvertex)(in the web version). Owners, organizations and
registrars are represented by green vertices.
The increasing number of vertices appearing in cyber-
threat infrastructures make their analysis a complex task.
Fig. 4 depicts the evolution of ﬁve days cyber-threat in-
frastructures. To overcome the complexity of cyber-threat
graphs, we use a graph abstraction technique, where we
decompose heterogeneous directed graphs (vertices rep-
resenting many types) into homogenous weighted graphs.
To illustrate the abstraction, we consider the case of mal-
ware samples sharing two domains. Initially, each vertex vi,
representing a malware sample, is linked to two vertices,
vd1 and vd2, representing visited domains. This sub-graph is
abstracted to two linked vertices vd1 and vd2, representing
domains. The edge between vd1 and vd2 is labeled with the
number of malware shared by these domains. Fig. 5 depicts
the abstraction of cyber-threat infrastructure graphs. By
performing abstraction, we generate the following sub-
graphs: (1) Domain-Malware graph: Domains are linked if
Fig. 3. Example of a cyber-threat infrastructure.
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graph: Domains are linked if they resolve to shared IPs. (3)
IP-Malware graph: IPs are linked if shared malware samples
connect to. (4) Owner-Malware graph: Owners are linked if
they own domains that are visited by shared malware
samples. (5) Owner-Physical address graph: Owners are
linked if they register different domains with the same
physical addresses. (6) Organization-Malware graph: Orga-
nizations are linked if they have IPs connected by shared
malware samples.Fig. 4. Components representing Cyber-Threat Infrastructures.Badness scoring
In this research effort, we put an emphasis on ﬁnding
what are the key players in cyber-threat infrastructures. The
importance of vertices in a network graph is known as
vertex's centrality. The latter represents a real-valued
function produced to provide a ranking, which identiﬁes
the most important nodes (Borgatti (2005)). Despite the
fact that different centralities, namely, degree centrality
(Sabidussi (1966)), closeness centrality (Stephenson and
Zelen (1989); Dangalchev (2006)), betweenness centrality
(Freeman (1977)), and Eigenvector centrality (Bonacich
(2007)), are widely used in the analysis of different social
networks, we are mostly interested in evaluating the
importance or inﬂuence of different actors in cyber-threat
infrastructures. For this purpose, some algorithms have
been deﬁned, such as, Hypertext Induced Topic Search
(HITS) algorithm (Kleinberg (1999)) and Google's PageRank
algorithm (Brin and Page (1998)). In our approach, we
adopt Google's PageRank algorithm due to its efﬁciency,
feasibility, less query time cost, and less susceptibility to
localized links (Grover and Wason (2012)). In the sequel,
we brieﬂy introduce the PageRank algorithm and the
random-surfer model.
Deﬁnition 1. (PageRank). Let I(vi) be the set of vertices
that link to a vertex vi and let degout(vi) be the out-degree
centrality of a vertex vi. The PageRank of a vertex vi,
denoted by PR(vi), is provided in Eq. (1):
PRðviÞ ¼ d
2
4 X
vj2IðviÞ
PR

vj

degoutðviÞ
3
5þ ð1 dÞ 1jDj (1)
In the aforementioned formula, the constant d is called
damping factor. Its value is generally assumed to be set to
Fig. 5. CTI graphs abstraction.
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equation per vertex vi with an equal number of unknown
PR(vi) values. Assuming that the PageRank values PR(vi)
sum up to 1 (sumni¼1PRðviÞ ¼ 1), then the PageRank algo-
rithm tries to ﬁnd out iteratively different PageRank values.
This algorithm has been developed intuitively considering
a user surﬁng the Web, starting from a web page and
randomly visiting another web page through a link. If the
user is on page vj with a probability d (damping factor),
then the probability for this user to visit another page vi is
equal to 1/degout(vj). With a probability of 1d, the user will
stop following links and pick another random page in V.
Since the web-surﬁng process shows randomness, the au-
thors of the PageRank algorithm claim that the PageRank
values can be computed through a stochastic process. Thus,
a stochastic transition matrix W is deﬁned. The vertices
ranking values are computed as expressed in Eq. (2):
PR
! ¼ dW : PR!þ ð1 dÞ 1jDj 1
!
(2)
The stochastic matrix W is deﬁned as follows:
wij ¼ 1degout

vj
 if a vertex is linked to vi
wij ¼ 0 otherwise
The notation R/ stands for a vector where its ith
element is PR(vi) (PageRank of vi). The notation 1
!
stands
for a vector having all elements equal to 1. The computation
of PageRank values is done iteratively by deﬁning a
convergence stopping criterion ε. At each computation stept, a new vector ð PR!; tÞ is generated based on previous
vector values ð PR!; t  1Þ. The algorithm stops computing
values when the condition
ð PR!; tÞ  ð PR!; t  1Þ< ε is
satisﬁed. In our case, since graphs are abstracted to
weighted undirected graphs, the out-degree centrality of a
vertex vi is similar to the degree centrality. However, the
weights of edges for each vertex are normalized with
values between 0 and 1. The deﬁnition of the stochastic
matrix W is slightly changed to:
wij ¼ eij  1degout

vj
 if a vertex is linked to
wij ¼ 0 otherwise
eij : edge

vi; vj
 ðnormalized weight valueÞ
The reason behind using PageRank algorithm to
compute badness of vertices lies in: (1) Scores are
computed through a stochastic approach, which reﬂects
randomness in the evolution of a model. With respect to
cyber-threat infrastructures, we assume that there exists a
random evolution, on a daily basis, in the appearance of
malware samples, domains, IPs, servers, organizations,
owners and registrars. Such appearance of new vertices
impacts the evolution of badness scores. (2) The random
web-surfer model illustrates how web pages can be
accessed with a probability value (damping factor). In
analogy with cyber-threat infrastructures, the probabilistic
approach is interesting since it reﬂects potential actions
done through infected machines: A malicious domain can
be visited through an infected machine, an IP address can
be connected by infected machines or resolved to a
A. Boukhtouta et al. / Digital Investigation 14 (2015) S3eS15S8malicious domain or a server, an FTP server can be used to
upload stolen information, an SMTP server can be used to
launch spam or phishing campaigns, an IRC channel can be
used to instruct bots to launch DDoS attacks, malware
propagation or other malicious activities.Patterns inference
Here, we closely study how cyber-threat infrastructures
evolve over time. To this end, we target the identiﬁcation of
discernible regularities and irregularities in such in-
frastructures by isolating observable patterns in the
generated graphs. In cyber-threat infrastructures, a pattern
is associated with possible relationships between domains,
IPs, owners and organizations. To infer patterns, we
compute similarities between graphs collected on a daily
basis.
Computation of similarity between graphs is a chal-
lenging task especially when dealing with large-scale
evolving graphs. To overcome this challenge, we resort to
the so-called graph kernels (Ralaivola et al. (2005);
Vishwanathan et al. (2010); G€artner (2003)). A graph
kernel is a function that computes the similarity between
graphs using linear methods. However, for large-scale
graphs, graph kernel methods generate vectors with highFig. 6. Fingerprintidimensions that are not easy to handle. To address this
issue, graph kernel methods require an important process
known as ﬁngerprinting (Ralaivola et al. (2005)). The latter
consists of producing compact representations, known as
ﬁngerprints, for graph structures based on the generated
vectors. Graph similarities are then computed using these
ﬁngerprints. To generate graph ﬁngerprints, we use the
min-hashing technique. Our approach of computing graph
similarities is inspired by the work published by (Teixeira
et al. (2012)) who introduced a ﬁngerprinting technique
for graph kernels based on min-hashing. In the sequel, we
introduce ourmethodology used to observe the presence of
patterns and how they are inferred. First, we present the
different steps to compute similarities between graphs, as
illustrated in Fig. 6. These steps are: (1) decomposition, (2)
vector generation, and (3) ﬁngerprinting.Decomposition
During this step, we decompose each graph, obtained
from the abstraction process, into a set of substructures.
These substructures may be obtained based on paths, cy-
cles, trees, etc. In our approach, we decompose graphs
based on paths between graph vertices. In other words, two
vertices v1 and v2 form a substructure if there is an edge
between v1 and v2.ng approach.
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This step consists of mapping graph substructures into
vectors. Algorithm 1 takes as input, a set of substructures
S(G) obtained from decomposing a graph G. For each sub-
structure, we convert it into an integer value using the
formula in line 3, where a is a random number, P is a big
prime number such that 0<a<P, and L is the labelling
function that returns the number of malware shared be-
tween vi and vj.
Fingerprinting
The vectors generated from the graph substructures
might have high dimensionalities for large-scale graphs. To
reduce the dimensionality of a vector, we use ﬁngerprinting
to produce a compact representation that is easy to handle.
To this end, we adopt the ideas presented in (Teixeira et al.
(2012)) to ﬁngerprint graphs based on min-hashing. The
ﬁngerprinting method is presented in Algorithm 2. It takes
as inputs, a vector generated from the substructures of a
graph G and a set of m hash functions h1,h2,…,hm. It pro-
duces as output, a ﬁngerprint of graph G, which is a
compact representation of the input vector. The ﬁngerprint
consists of a vector of m min-hash values, where m is the
number of hash functions.
Graph similarity computation
Graph similarities are represented through a matrix,
where each value is proportional to the number of values,
in the min-hash vectors, that are shared between graph
pairs (Fig. 6). This matrix is important for grouping graphs
with proportional similarities into groups that can be good
candidates to detect patterns between corresponding min-
hash values. The graph similarity matrix provides a big
picture of the evolution of cyber-threat infrastructures over
time. However, it needs to be leveraged to extract patterns
effectively. To this end, we propose an algorithm to infer
patterns as explained hereafter.Pattern time-based inference
In order to extract patterns, we elaborate a time-based
inference algorithm (Algorithm 3). This algorithm takes,
as inputs, a similarity matrix, an analysis period (in terms of
days), a time window (usually one day), and a density
threshold to ﬁlter days where we have low similarities in
the matrix. The algorithm collects common patterns, by
sliding the time window through the analysis period, and
checks if the similarity value is higher or equal to the
density threshold. If so, it computes the intersection be-
tween patterns found on days representing the row and
column index in the similarity matrix. The collected pat-
terns are stored in a list structure that we sort at the end to
collect the most or least occurring patterns.Experimental results
In the sequel, we present our analysis results of cyber-
threat infrastructures. The results include descriptive sta-
tistics, badness ranking and patterns inference. It is
important to mention that due to the sensitivity of the
collected data, we have anonymized domains, IPs, organi-
zations, owners and addresses. For domain names, we
remove some characters at the beginning or at the middle
of domain names and replace themwith “*”character. For IP
addresses, we replace some digits with “x” character.
Regarding organizations, for each country, we replace or-
ganization names with indexed codes; for example,
ORG1(CHINA)-GD represents an organization which has a
network located in China, Guangdong city. For owners, we
replace names with initials. For physical addresses, we
mask some digits and letters with “*” character.
Dataset description
Our dataset consists of one year malware data collected
from 25th August 2013 to 25th August 2014. Table 1 pre-
sents some statistics regarding the collected data. It is
important to mention that the domains are ﬁltered and do
not contain legitimate domains that are listed in the top
one million Alexa whitelist domains (Alexa (2015)).
Table 1
Dataset description.
Collected data Statistics
Malware samples 4,717,628
Domains 9,303,378
Second-level domains 151,757
IPs that domains resolve to 240,174
IPs that malware connect to 118,270
Domain Whois records 110,414
IP Whois records 287,005
Table 3
Domain vs. Number of Resolving IPs.
Domain # IPs
j.nb*.com 23,021
ip*.33*.org 10,779
f.nb*.com 10,313
i.nb*.com 7,130
g.nb*.com 5,825
*sopuli.*to.org 4,300
h.nb*.com 4,232
e.nb*.com 3,963
router.bi*.com 3,573
*lytics.com 3,342
Table 4
Resolving IPs vs. Number of domains.
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In this section, we present some statistics that we
generated from our analysis of cyber-threat infrastructures.IP # Domains
184.1xx.xxx.x6 171,388
199.xxx.xx.xx0 125,454
184.x7x.xxx.xx5 90,766
184.x7x.xxx.xx0 84,296
184.x7x.xxx.xx8 82,104
216.2xx.xxx.x5 21,402
216.2xx.xxx.x1 20,521
46.xx.xxx.x0 13,606
162.xxx.x.xx4 7,410Domains & resolving IPs
Table 2 lists the top-10 most visited second-level do-
mains by malware. We notice that ﬁve out of ten of these
domains are legitimate. This can be explained by the fact
that malware samples tend to test connectivity by visiting
legitimate domains or redirecting access to legitimate do-
mains to fake webpages. Malware also connect to legiti-
mate domains to download vulnerable patches of operating
systems or software to exploit vulnerabilities and perpe-
trate malicious activities.
Table 3 lists the top-10 fast-ﬂuxing domains (domains
that resolve to many IPs). We observe the presence of do-
mains that have the same second-level domain, nb*.com,
and resolve to many IP addresses. A main observation from
this table is that fast ﬂux and dynamic generated domain
names are widely used by malware.
Table 4 illustrates the most shared resolving IPs be-
tween domains. We observe the presence of resolving IPs
belonging to the same IP space. There are two IP spaces (IPs
startingwith “184” and “216”) containingmany resolving IP
addresses. The presence of common IP spaces implicitly
infers that cyber-criminals are prone to use an IP infra-
structure to perpetrate malicious activities, or infect
vulnerable IP spaces to let them be part of their botnets.
The IP address “184.1xx.xxx.x6” represents the most
resolved IP. By tracking associated domains, we observe
that it resolves to domains dynamically generated and
belonging to the same second-level domain. The domain
generator associated with this IP generates a set of lettersTable 2
Domains vs. Number of Malware.
2nd Level domain # Malware
*il.ru 252,358
*entre.ru 194,749
*soft.com 190,327
*update.com 166,995
*admr.com 160,123
cloud*.net 137,883
*lytics.com 119,233
*box.net 113,619
*host2.com 110,373
*tal.com 106,817and digits. The length of the chars sequence is 30. The
second-level domain is *eker.com. Malware families asso-
ciated with the top listed IP are: antiav, barys, graftor,
injector, ramnit, sality, slugin, swisyn, symmi, vbinject, virut
and zusy.
Table 5 lists the number of resolving IPs per network
name belonging to organizations. We observe that China
has the highest number of resolving IPs since 9 out of 10
network names spread throughout different Chinese re-
gions. There is only one American network name that is
present in the top-10 of networks containing resolving IPs.Connected IPs
Table 6 lists the number of malware that connect to IPs.
Connected IPs are directly accessed by malware through
conventional protocols (e.g., FTP, IRC, and SMTP) and un-
conventional TCP and UDP ports. In contrast to resolving
IPs, connected IPs are spread through many IP spaces. WeTable 5
Network name vs. Number of resolving IPs.
Network # IPs
ORG1(CHINA)-GD 12,880
ORG1(CHINA)-JS 7,245
ORG2(CHINA)-SD 5,113
ORG2(CHINA)-HA 3,745
ORG2(CHINA)-HE 3,597
ORG1(USA)-2011L 3,255
ORG1(CHINA)-SC 3,232
ORG1(CHINA)-FJ 3,001
ORG1(CHINA)-HB 2,844
ORG2(CHINA)-LN 2,815
Table 6
Connected IP vs. Number of Malware.
Domain # Malware
93.xxx.xx.xx0 11,553
65.xx.xx.xx7 4,497
219.xxx.x.xx7 4,097
113.xx.xxx.xx6 3,223
95.xxx.xx.xx3 2,719
124.xxx.xxx.6 2,609
147.xxx.xxx.x7 2,498
69.xxx.xx.x0 2,429
89.xxx.xx.xx4 2,253
125.xx.xxx.x4 2,139
Table 8
Registrant vs. Number of domains.
Registrant # Domains
Registration private 2,983
Whoisguard protected 744
Domain administrator 632
Domain admin 451
Whois Agent 378
Perfect Privacy LLC 274
E*l Y. 187
Whois Privacy Protection Service 184
Private Registrant 163
Oneandone Private Registration 123
Spy Eye 120
This domain for sale toll free:*-822-* 104
DNS Admin 92
Reactivation Period 92
Domain Manager 75
A. Boukhtouta et al. / Digital Investigation 14 (2015) S3eS15 S11observe that all the listed IPs are from different IP spaces.
This can be explained by the absence of fast-ﬂuxing. Con-
nected IPs are dedicated to be a depot of stolen information,
a spamming server, IRC channel, or a nest of other malware
samples ready to be downloaded. The top listed connected
IP has been associated with a VPN anonymity service. We
observe a high interaction with this IP and the following
malware families: antiav, barys, esfury, hype, injector, navi-
promo, pirminay, ramnit, slugin, swisyn, symmi, vbinject,
virut, vundo, and zbot.
Table 7 illustrates the number of connected IPs within
top-10 network names. We observe that 8 out of 10
network names are located in Asian countries. The number
of organizations is 9, among which 3 are Chinese organi-
zations, 2 are Korean and 2 are American organizations.
However, top ranking network names belong to a Malay-
sian and an Indian organization respectively. TheMalaysian
network name is associated with 3 malware samples,
namely, a variant of zlob, a variant of zbot, and a variant of
proxyTroj. The latter is a proxy Trojan, which infects com-
puters to play the role of a Command & Control and bot at
the same time. Usually, such malware variants tend to
communicate and cooperate through infected machines.Whois information
Table 8 lists the different registrants and the corre-
sponding number of domains. We notice that people
behind suspicious domains use privacy services to protect
their identities. Thus, there exists a big number of domains
that share the same private registrants. In the aforemen-
tioned table, 12 out of 15 registrants are protected by pri-
vacy services and one registrant has a regular name (E*l Y.).Table 7
Network name vs. Number of connected IPs.
Network # IPs
ORG1(MALAYSIA)-HSDPA 10,093
ORG1(INDIA)-SouthZone 2,176
ORG1(CHINA)-GD 1,089
ORG1(KOREA) 837
ORG1(USA)-2011L 739
ORG3(CHINA) 681
ORG1(CHINA)-JS 604
ORG2(KOREA) 472
ORG4(CHINA) 358
ORG2(USA) 309We observe also the presence of a registrant with the name
of a well-known malware family, namely, Spy Eye (Sood
et al. (2013)). The domains registered with Spy Eye have
been visited by 830 malware samples, mainly belonging to
the following malware families: conjar, fareit, nebuler, zbot
and zusy (zbot variant). All these families represent Trojan
bots involved in password stealing, downloading other
malware samples, modifying system ﬁles and registry,
adding startup items to systems, etc. We also notice that
there are 104 domains registered with a message (This
domain for sale toll free: *-822-*). This phenomenon is
known as domains’ parking, where blackhat Search Engine
Optimization (SEO) people are used to infect machineswith
malware samples to contact these domains andmake them
visible for different search engines. A domain is easier to
sell, the more visible it is.
Table 9 lists the different physical addresses associated
with registered second-level domains. We notice that
708 s-level domains are registered with an address located
in Panama. This address corresponds to a privacy service
that hides relevant registrants’ information. This service is
prone to suspicious activities since it serves spamming
domains, websites of companies involved in robot-calls and
scam abuses.Badness ranking
In the sequel, we provide a description of different ob-
servations related to the computation of badness scores for
IPs, domains and owners.Table 9
Physical Address vs. Number of Registered domains.
Address # Domains
P.O. Box********* Panama 708
***** Northsight blvd****9 USA 379
***** Gran bay parkway w. USA 272
***** P.O. Box** Beach Australia 228
***** Memorial Dr.#935 USA 186
Ilyinka Street** Russia 120
*****24th Street USA 115
*** Lee Road Suite**0 USA 108
*** Main street#*** USA 108
**** Boulevard Massena France 87
Table 10
Top-10 domains badness scores.
Domain Avg score 103
*entre.ru 5.1194617836
*box.net 3.50800756525
*spectr.ru 2.89366998268
*ﬁle.ru 2.33333105403
*sung.ru 2.17069956058
*express.ru 2.0137619806
*ldr.ru 1.6519902951
*.elb.*aws.com 1.43752913358
d1sx0cjuasqkw9.*ront.net 1.41139045489
*pro.ru 1.40483436327
Table 11
Top-10 connected IPs badness scores.
IP Avg score 103
93.xxx.xx.xx0 6.90947359832
46.xxx.xxx.xx9 5.76183602875
113.xx.xxx.xx6 5.1836928519
220.xxx.xxx.7 4.53174275775
125.xx.xxx.x4 4.52513888983
124.xxx.xxx.x1 4.51910871828
221.xxx.xxx.x8 4.31768525507
91.xxx.xx.x0 3.06311160603
239.255.255.250 2.88498391036
89.xxx.xx.xx4 2.5103999827
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for domains observed on one year. We notice that 7 out of
10 domains have “.ru” extension. One of the obtained do-
mains is dynamically generated. An interesting fact is that 5
out of 7 “.ru” domains are registered with the same infor-
mation (registrant is known as “Private Person” and the
same name servers). The number of associated malware is
830. In addition, these domains share a lot of malware
families, spanning over bot Trojans and bitcoiners, mainly
badur, bitcoinminer, graftor, kryptik, loadmoney, minggy,
strictor, symmi, and zusy (zbot variant). We suspect thatFig. 7. Top-5 domainspeople belonging to the same criminal group use the same
registrant information and are behind bitcoining cam-
paigns and botnet activities.
Table 11 illustrates the top-10 average badness scores
for connected IPs. The top ranked badness IP is the same
leading IP “93.xxx.xx.xx0” observed in Table 6. The same
observation can be made on IPs “113.xx.xxx.xx6” and
“125.xx.xxx.x4”, which are present in both Tables. The
reason is that these IPs have maintained a badness score
throughout the whole year, whereas other IPs, listed in
Table 6, have not maintained their badness score as much
as the IPs listed in Table 11. It is important to notice the
presence of the IP “239.255.255.250”, which is SSDP mul-
ticast reserved IP. This IP is mainly used by what are called
Universal Plug and Play (UP&P) malware families, e.g.,
conﬁcker, downadup and their variants. These malware
infect other machines through vulnerabilities found in
Windows server services (e.g., RPC Handling Remote Code
Execution Vulnerability). Aben (2008); Messmer (2009)
illustrate how UP&P devices can be used as an infection
vector through SSDP protocol. Such vector of infection is
still active since we observe a lot of new variants con-
necting to “239.255.255.250” IP address.
In Fig. 7 and Fig. 8, we present the evolution of the
badness scores for the top-5 domains and connected IPs.
We observe that the badness of domains has a periodic
badness persistence. For instance, the domain “*entre.ru”
had high badness scores during the ﬁrst 60 days and the
domain “*box.net” had high badness scores during the last
70 days. Similarly, the domain “*spectr.ru” had high badness
scores during a period of 40 days, the domain “*ﬁle.ru” had
high badness scores during a period of 75 days, and the
domain “*sung.ru” had high badness scores during 30 days.
However, we can observe some sporadic changes in scores
for all the domains (spikes after observing low badness
ranking). For instance, the domain “*entre.ru” had some
score changes at days 95, 149, 334 and 345. Similarly, the
domain “*spectr.ru” had some changes of scores between
day 195 and day 210 and the domain *sung.ru” had changes
of scores at days 96, 150, 335 and 346. In contrast tobadness score.
Fig. 8. Top-5 IPs badness score.
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(abrupt changes of scores). All the observed IPs had idle
time periods, where their badness scores were equal to 0.
For instance, the IP “93.xxx.xx.xx0” had an abrupt change
in day 147 and the IP “113.xx.xxx.xx6” had an abrupt
change in day 200.
Fig. 9 illustrates different owners sharing malware
samples in July 2014. The colored graph network contains
different communities, obtained by applying a community
detection algorithm (Blondel et al. (2008)), where each
color represents a community. We managed to obtain 23
communities. The graph nodes have been anonymized. We
can also notice that the bigger a node is, the higher is its
badness score. For instance, the person “A.Di.M” has the
highest badness score (0.029), followed by the person
“D.VAN.A” (score of 0.028). The third place is sharedFig. 9. Registrants communities and badness scores.between three people, namely, “M.K.S.M”, “A.K”, and
“A.D.de.M.S” (score of 0.026).
Patterns inference
Fig. 10 and Fig. 11 illustrate the similarity matrix ob-
tained during one year period. A major observation is that
domains have more patterns than connected IPs. Similarly
to badness ranking, patterns in domains are more persis-
tent and periodic. We observe high density in the ﬁrst and
last semesters in the domain patterns similarity matrix.
Connected IPs show less periodicity than domains. The
presence of patterns tends to be ephemeral and the
maximum period is commonly in the order of 1e60 days.
However, there are some IPs that have some persistence.
Such case is illustrated hereafter in the pattern use cases.Fig. 10. Domain patterns similarity matrix.
Fig. 11. IP Patterns similarity matrix.
Table 13
IP patterns use case.
Patterns Days Mal. Networks
220.xxx.xxx.7; 125.xx.xxx.x4 317 2123 ORG1-BJ; ORG5
220.xxx.xxx.7; 124.xxx.xxx.x1 311 2068 ORG1-BJ; ORG1-HE
221.xxx.xxx.x8; 125.xx.xxx.x4 289 1938 ORG6; ORG5
220.xxx.xxx.7; 221.xxx.xxx.x8 289 1948 ORG1-BJ; ORG6
124.xxx.xxx.x1; 125.xx.xxx.x4 278 1925 ORG1-HE; ORG5
124.xxx.xxx.x1; 221.xxx.xxx.x8 123 1836 ORG1-HE; ORG6
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generated in the same way. In this case, we have three
domain names with two letters followed by two digits. All
these domains share a big number of malware samples (in
the order of 6,000malware samples). In addition, they have
the same owner protected by the same privacy service.
Such use case acknowledges the observation found in Table
8 and i.e., the hosting companies with a privacy service are
nests for suspicious domains.
Table 13 shows IP patterns connected by thousands of
malware samples. These IPs are located in China, where we
observe 4 organizations with 5 network names. All the
patterns have appeared during long time periods: more
than 300 days for the ﬁrst two patterns, 289 days for the
third and fourth patterns and 123 days for the last pattern.
This use case indicates that there is a cluster of IP patterns
that represents a collaborative malware activity in China.Related work
Various research efforts use graph theory for the pur-
pose of studying social media networks. Java et al. (2007)
investigate microblogging phenomena through studying
topological and geographical properties of Twitter's social
network. Johan Ugander et al. (2011) study the structure of
the Facebook social graph using different network features
such as degree distribution, path length, clustering, and
mixing patterns. Luca Deri and Simone Mainardi represent
collected DNS with ”.it” sufﬁx data through complexTable 12
Domain patterns use case.
Patterns Days Mal. Owners
f*[dd]75.com; a*[dd]75.com 332 6045 Registration Private
f*[dd]75.com; w*[dd]88 329 6046 Registration Private
w*[dd]88.com; a*[dd]75.com 317 5966 Registration Privategraphs. They found that the Italian DNS ecosystem, repre-
sented through domain and resolver degree frequencies,
follows power law distributions, and acknowledged the
nature of DNS large scale evolution. In another work, Deri
et al. (2013) aim to rank Internet domains based on their
popularity across resolvers. Regarding threat network
analysis, Nadj et al. (2013) conduct an outstanding effort to
unveil the structure of criminal networks. They use DNS
history of known C&Cs, IPs found in blacklists, and spam
URLs to build graphs. They develop a method based on the
Eigenvector metric to identify general structural trends and
determine which strategy should be adopted for an effec-
tive remediation through takedown. The authors show that
in many cases, by de-registering ﬁve domain names, many
criminal networks can be taken down. Moreover, in one
highlighted case, disabling 20% of criminal network hosts
reduces the volume of successful malicious DNS lookups by
70%. Despite the interesting results shown by Nadj et al.,
2013 we provide more insightful information related to
cyber-threat infrastructures by including new actors such
as malware families, second-level domains, organizations,
owners, etc. We also focus on the study of the evolution of
cyber-threat infrastructures to understand the scale and
forecast the potential evolution in the near future.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented an approach to inves-
tigate cyber-threats and the underlying infrastructures. To
this end, we use graph-theory concepts to rank the badness
of different infrastructure elements. This allowed us to
identify key players and quantify the sharing among these
players. This is of paramount importance as it helps to
unveil potential criminal groups. Moreover, we have pre-
sented amethodology to track the evolution of cyber-threat
infrastructures over time and infer patterns of cyberecri-
minal activities. Using one year dataset, we have derived
important insights about cyber-threats. As a future work,
we plan to design and integrate a near real-time cyber-
threat situational awareness dashboard. To this end, we
will automate the approach presented in this paper. In
addition, based on the observations found in the evolution
of badness scores for domains and connected IPs, we aim to
assess the empirical periods to consider for domains
badness persistence and IPs badness sporadicalness.
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